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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRI-
GATION COMPANY, a corporation; 
TIMPANOGOS CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; UPPER EAST UNION 
CANAL COMPANY, a corporation; 
WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; EAST RIVER BOT-
TOM WATER COMPANY, a corpora-
tion; FORT FIELD IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation; LITTLE 
DRY CREEK IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, a corporation; SMITH DITCH 
COMPANY, an unincorporated asso-
ciation; FAUCETT FIELD DITCH 
COMPANY, an unincorporated asso-
ciation; RIVERSIDE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, an unincorporated asso-
ciation; and PROVO CITY, a muni-
cipal corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs. -
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer 
of the State of Utah (Successor in 
office of Ed. H. Watson, former State 
Engineer of the State of Utah) and 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
through its Bureau of Reclamation, 
Department of the Interior, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Cases 
Nos. 8390 
and 8391. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, STATE ENGINEER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STA~rEMENT OF FAC~rS 
The record in this case is voluminous, consisting of 
some 1200 pages of reported testimony in addition to 
many exhibits and numerous pleadings; but, for the 
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purpose of this appeal by the State Engineer, only the 
complaint of the plaintiffs and the findings, conclusions 
and judgment of the trial court are of importance. They 
are found at R. 5 to 19 in Case No. 8390 and R. 5 to 19 
in Case No. 8391, and R. 242 to 262 in Case No. 8390 
and R. 229 to 248 in Case No. 8391, respectively. 
This case came before this Court once before upon 
petition of the United States for an extraordinary writ 
to prevent the District Court from taking jurisdiction 
on the ground of the sovereign immunity of the United 
States. This Court denied the writ in United States v. 
District Court, 238 P. 2d 1132; and, a petition for rehear-
ing was denied and this opinion is reported at 242 P. 2d 
77 4 and at page 777 of 242 Pacific Reporter 2nd Series 
this Court said: "We know of no case of an appeal from 
the decision of an executive board or officer where the 
appellate trjbunal adjudicates new issues not within the 
jurisdiction of the original tribunal to determine.'' 
For the purpose of this appeal the necessary facts 
are almost matters of common knowledge among the 
citizens of this state. The United States through its 
Bureau of Reclamation constructed the Deer Creek 
Reservoir on the Provo River and contracted with the 
Provo River Water Users Association for repayment of 
the cost thereof. Stockholders in this Association are the 
~Ietropolitan Water Districts of the following municipali-
ties: Salt Lake City, Orem, Provo, Lehi, American Fork 
and Pleasant Grove-Linden, as well as irrigation com-
panies, some of whom are as follows: Provo Reservoir 
Water Users Company, Utah Lake Distributing Com-
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pa11y, Hewlett Ranches, Victory Ranches, Provo Bench 
Canal and Irrigation Company (one of the plaintiffs in 
the present action), Dixon Irrigation Company, Washing-
ton Irrigation Company, South Kamas Irrigation Com-
pany and Beaver and Shingle Creek Irrigation Company. 
Prior to construction it was necessary to obtain title to 
those lands that would be inundated by the reservoir 
and, in so obtaining title the United States also purchased 
some 50 c.f.s. of water that had been awarded those 
lands under the Provo River decree. As in most river 
systems in this state, the return flow was important and 
the decree tied the seepage or drainage to the land for 
the benefit and protection of the lower users. 
The United States through its Bureau of Reclama-
tion filed with the State Engineer of Utah an application 
to change the place and nature of use of this 50 second 
feet, ·whieh amount was reduced by amendment during 
the hearing before the State Engineer to approximately 
12.5 second feet, and thereupon the State Engineer 
approved this change application. This amount was 
further reduced during the trial to 1.54 c.f.s. and 7.9 
c.f.s., respectively, or a total of 9.33 second feet. Para-
graphs 11 and 12, and 13, respectively, of the Findings 
of Fact specifically show the action of the trial court 
in this regard. We should place emphasis upon the 
fact that we are concerned \vith n change application 
and not a savings application although the word sav-
ings is often used in the record, and we shall more 
thoroughly cover this point during the part of this brief 
devoted to argument. The Findings above referred to 
are of sufficient importance to be quoted here and read 
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as follows: ''That the defendant, the United States of 
America, acquired for the Provo River Project, the land 
now comprising the Deer Creek Reservoir site, and cer-
tain water rights appurtenant thereto aggregating 9.20 
second feet, as specifically described in Exhibit A to said 
application No. a-1902, and by reference made a part 
hereof; subject, however, to that certain decree of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State 
of Utah, generally known and referred to as No. 2888, 
and herein referred to as such.'' 
''That prior to the construction of Deer Creek Reser-
voir, the owners of the land in said reservoir site diverted 
43.292 second feet of water from the Provo River and 
tributaries under and by virtue of the rights described 
in said Exhibit A of application a-1902, was amended by 
the State Engineer's office, by which amendment it was 
proposed to change the point of diversion, place and 
nature of use of said 10.30 second feet of water from 
the land in the Deer Creek Reservoir site to the Provo 
River Project land described in Exhibit C to said appli-
cation a-1902; that during the trial it was stipulated that 
a portion of the land described in said application lies 
above the flow line of the reservoir and that the water 
rights appurtenant thereto should be eliminated from 
the application and that by reason thereof the water 
right sought to be changed should be reduced from 
10.30 to 7.9 second feet; that under the pre-reservoir 
conditions said 7.9 second feet of water was lost to the 
river and was consumed by evaporation and plant life." 
And finally we should stress that paragraphs 12 and 
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13, respectively, of the Findings of Fact found that the 
said 9.33 second feet of water "under prereservoir con-
ditions ... was lost to the river and was consumed by 
evaporation and plant life." It is the United State's 
application to change the place and nature of use of this 
9.33 second feet with which we are concerned here. 
The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to introduce 
evidence concerning a fault zone passing across the 
reservoir area, concerning brecciated conditions on the 
floor and sides of the reservoir, concerning increased 
pressure of water on the fault zone and brecciated areas, 
concerning bank storage and concerning the raising of 
the water table around the perimeter of the reservoir. 
The trial court made findings and conclusions as to these 
matters and embodied them in paragraph numbered four 
in the judgment in each case below. To the introduction 
of this evidence, proper objection was timely made. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRI~D IN FINDING 
AND CONCLUDING r:rHAT CERTAIN DECREE 
l\IADE AND ENTERED IN 'THE FOURTH .JUDI-
CIAL DIS1'RICT COURT IN AND :B-,OR urrAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO. 2888, AND 
COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE PROVO 
RIVER DECHEE, \VAS Hl1~~< ,\D.TUDICAT;\ AXD 
BINDING UPON THE DEFENDANT UNITED 
STATES AXD PREVENTI1JD 1'H1~ APPROVAL OF 
THE UHANOE APPLlUArriO:\S FILJ1JD BY rl'HE 
UNITED STATE~; BUT ON rrHE CONTRARY TH:BJ 
CHANGE APPLICATIONS W:B~RE ENTrrLED TO 
BE APPROVED AND THE APPLICANrr P:BJRJ\IIIT-
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·rED TO PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN. THE ERROR 
HERE CLAIMED IS DIRECTED AT FINDINGS 
NOS. 17, 18, AND 19 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15462 AND 
AT FINDINGS NOS. 18, 19 AND 20 IN CIVIL CASE 
NO. 15463 IN THE COURT BELOW AND AT CON-
CLUSION NO. 3 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUM-
BERED 3 OF THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES 
IN THE COURT BELOW. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT RECEIVED EVIDENCE 
AND MADE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN 
EXCESS OF ITS POWER SO TO DO AND ENTERED 
JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. THAT CONCLUSION 
NO. 4 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 4 OF 
THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES BELOW ARE 
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE 
ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ENTER-
TAINED AND HEARD BY THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THEREFORE ARE BEYOND THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
AND CONCLUDING THAT CERTAIN DECREE 
MADE AND ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO. 2888, AND 
COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE PROVO 
RIVER DECREE, WAS RES ADJUDICATA AND 
BINDING UPON THE DEFENDANT UNITED 
STATES AND PREVENTED THE APPROVAL OF 
THE CHANGE APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE 
UNITED STATES; BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE 
CHANGE APPLICATIONS WERE ENTITLED TO 
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BE APPROVED AND THE APPLICANT PERMIT-
TED r_ro PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN. THE ERROR 
HERE CLAIMED IS DIRECTED AT FINDINGS 
NOS. 17, 18, AND 19 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15462 AND 
A'r FINDINGS NOS. 18, 19 AND 20 IN CIVIL CASE 
l\0. 154G3 I~ THE COURT BELO\V AND AT CON- • 
CLUSION NO. 3 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUM-
BERED 3 OF THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES 
IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The trial court has in effect stated that a change 
application may not be approved if the water in question 
is the subject of a decree that has tied it to certain lands; 
and paragraph 3 of the judgment of the trial court 
recites that the United States is bound by the Provo 
River Decree, that the waters of said river cannot be 
"used upon any land other than that then irrigated at 
the time of the entry of said decree so as to cause any 
of the seepage or drainage therefrom to be diverted 
away from the channel of Provo River or from the lands 
theretofore irrigated thereby; and that any water there-
tofore appurtenant to the lands inundated by said Deer 
Creek Reservoir must be permitted to flow down Provo 
River to satisfy the rights of lower users including 
plaintiffs herein.'' ·vve respectfully submit that this 
paragraph of the judgment is rontrary to the law of 
this state and cannot be upheld. 
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use and may use 
the water for other purposes than those for which 
it was originally appropriated, but no such change 
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shall be made if it impairs any vested right with-
out just compensation. 
This section then details the manner and method by 
which these changes may be accomplished in the State 
Engineer's Office. 
And this statute has been interpreted and stated 
in the negative by this Court in East Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 U. 2d 170, 271 P. 2d 449, 
as follows: 
Thus a change in place of diversion or the place 
or nature of use or a combination of such changes 
cannot be made if the lower users, whether prior 
or subsequent to the rights of the parties making 
the change, will thereby be deprived of the use of 1 1 
water which they would have had under the use 
which the upper appropriators made before the 
change. Such a change would enlarge the rights 
of the upper appropriators and impair the vested 
rights of the lower users because their rights were 
established on the basis that no such enlargement 
or changes of use would be made after the lower 
users had perfected their appropriation, and this 
is true of storage as well as direct flow waters. 
We should here emphasize two matters. First, the 
Provo River decree contemplated that the upper users 
could not make any changes in their practice that would 
decrease the return flow and the decree so states and 
this is consistent with the language quoted from the 
East Bench case, supra. But, this does not mean that 
any change is prohibited. The second point is the fact 
that there is no finding that the proposed change would 31 
impair the rights of the plaintiffs and an entire lack of 1n 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence to support such a finding if one were attempted 
to be made. 
We submit that change applications filed by water 
users are entitled to grave consideration and should be 
rejected only if it is clear and beyond question that the 
rights of others will be impaired; and we will demon-
strate that, even if other rights will be affected, change 
applications should still be approved with conditions 
attached to safeguard those rights of others. It should 
be here noted that approval of change applications is 
in no sense a final determination that the change will 
not affect others; but rather it is a determination only 
that the applicant may proceed with his proposed change 
on the probability that he may do so without harm to 
others. 
Hutchins on the Law of Water Rights, at page 278, 
says: 
It has long been the general rule that the appro-
priator may change the point of his diversion of 
water from the stream, or may change the place 
of use or even the purpose of his use of the water, 
so long as the rights of others are not thereby 
impaired. 
We believe that a brief review of the Utah cases on this 
question will compel the conclusion that the trial court's 
rejection of the change applications in <1nestion was 1n 
error and cannot be sustained. 
Changes in the manner and nature of use of water 
are becoming and will continue to become of paramount 
importance because of the rapidly diminishing supply 
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of unappropriated water within the state; and a number 
of rather recent cases have had occasion to discuss the 
change application. 
In Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reser-
voir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108, rehearing 
denied 104 Utah 216, 140 P. 2d 638, the Court approved 
an application to change the place of storage from the 
tributary to the main channel of the Beaver River. 
Certain limitations were attached to the approval and 
the Court indicated that the approval only gave the 
applicant a right to proceed, and that the protesting 
parties were not ''foreclosed from future actions for 
damages or injunctive relief if Kents Lake does inter-
fere with their rights." 
In lVhitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954, 
the Court called attention to the third paragraph of 
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads 
as follows: 
Applications for either permanent or temporary 
changes shall not be rejected for the sole reason 
that such change would impair vested rights of 
others, but if otherwise proper, they may be ap-
proved as to part of the water involved or upon 
condition that such conflicting rights be acquired. 
The Court then said : 
If a change application must not be rejected 
merely because there might be some conflict with 
vested rights, it would seem to follow that an 
original application should not be rejected when 
there is unappropriated water and the only con-
flict is with respect to the point of return. 
10 
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The case of Lehi Irrigation Compa;ny v. Jones, 115 
Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 892, although it deals with an appli-
cation to appropriate rather than a change application, 
does contain language that is particularly applicable to 
all applications before the State Engineer and directs 
their approval unless the evidence is clear and convinc-
ing that they must be rejected. The Court said: 
To rule otherwise would be to foreclose the appli-
cant in this case any opportunity to develop water 
if it in fact exists, and would have the effect of 
establishing a rule in this state not in conformity 
with the announced policy of the state to liberally 
construe rights toward the development and bene-
ficial use of all waters of the state. 
In American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 
(Utah) 239 P. 2d 188, the irrigation company sought to 
change a direct flow early season right to storage in a 
dam for later use in irrigating more valuable later season 
crops. The State Engineer rejected the application but 
his action was reversed by the trial court which latter 
action was affirmed by this Court, saying : 
Plaintiffs' proposal, if completed without impair-
ing vested rights, contemplates the more benefi-
cial use of water, a most desired result fully con-
sistent with progress and change, and reflecting 
the established poliey of thiH state. In a very 
Hcholarly and exhaust i V<' document, counsel for 
defendants insist that plaintiffs' proposal most 
certainly would invade uefendants' vested rights. 
If, in executing the plan, the plaintiffs interfere 
with or diminish the rights of others, a remedy 
is available, particularly since the trial court ap-
proved the application subject to the rights of 
11 
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others and ·without prejudice thereto, and sine(' 
approval of plaintiffs' application awards no 
vested rights but simply allows them to proceed 
with a plan specifically conditioned by the trial 
court on respecting the rights of others. The 
argument that this case may lead to multiplicity 
of litigation is negatived when it is recognized 
that each case must rest on its own peculiar facts. 
Such argument should not foreclose the oppor-
tunity and duty to accomplish that optimum use 
of water demanded in this arid region when it 
appears, and the trial court found, and which we 
believe the facts tend reasonably to indicate, that 
defendants will not suffer by operation of the plan. 
, And in a very recent case, Salt Lake City v. Boun-
dary Springs Water Users Assn., 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P. 
2d 453, a change application was approved in the fol-
lowing language : 
If the evidence shows that there is reason to 
believe that the proposed change can be made 
without impairing vested rights the application 
should be approved. The owner of a water right 
has a vested right to the quality as well as the 
quantity which he has beneficially used. A change 
application cannot be rejected without a showing 
that vested rights will thereby be substantially 
impaired. While the applicant has the general 
burden of showing that no impairment of vested 
rights will result from the change, the person 
opposing such application must fail if the evi-
dence does not disclose that his rights will be 
impaired. 
And in East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irri-
gation Co., supra, this Court makes the following state-
ment in connection with change applications: 
12 
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We conclude that the applications must be allowed 
but only on condition that the applicants make the 
changes outlined above in the use of their water in 
accordance with their testimony on that question 
so that such changes into storage and use on other 
lands will be made without increasing the amount 
or quantity of water consumed under such changes 
over the amount and quantity of water which 
would have been consumed had no change in the 
use been made. (Italics ours) 
The language above quoted from the East Bench 
case is, we submit, particularly appropriate to the issues 
here and we have emphasized the use of the word ''con-
sumed" for that reason. And we also believe that the 
trial court, in its findings, conclusions and decree, has 
lost sight of the real significance of an approval of an 
application by the State Engineer. This approval in no 
sense establishes a right but merely permits the appli-
cant to proceed with his proposed plan, and all of the 
cases that we have cited place emphasis upon this. As 
we will hereafter demonstrate, the trial court has gone 
beyond what the State Engineer had power to do and 
has adjudicated water rights, priorities and other 
matters that were not necessary for its decision here. 
May we again say that the only matter before the State 
Engineer and before the trial court was the question as 
to whether there was probable cause to believe that the 
change as proposed by the United States could be made 
without impairment of the rights of others. 
As we pointed out in the Statement of :B"lacts, this 
case has been before this Court before upon the petition 
of the United States for the issuance of an extraordinary 
1B 
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writ, which was denied. The opinion of this Court had 
occasion to discuss the problem here presented and in 
Un.ited States v. District Court, supra, and on page 1137 
of 238, Pacific Reporter 2d Series, this Court said : 
The engineer in granting an application does not 
determine that the applicant's rights are prior 
to the rights of the protestant but only finds there 
is reason to believe that the application may be 
granted and some water beneficially used there-
under without interfering with the rights of 
others. Under such a holding, the Engineer re-
jects applications only when it is clear that the 
applicant can establish no valuable rights there-
under, he does not adjudicate claims but decides 
only that there is probable cause to believe that 
applicant may be able to establish rights under 
his application without impairing the rights of 
others. Such a decision is administrative in na-
ture and purpose and the decision of the court on 
review, except for the formalities of the trial and 
judgment is of the same nature and for the same 
purpose. The object of the engineer's office is to 
maintain order and efficiency in the appropria-
tion, distribution and conservation of water and 
to allow as much water to be beneficially used as 
possible. So construed, the law provides a period 
of experimentation during which ways and means 
may be sought to make beneficial use of more 
water under the application before the rights of 
the parties are finally adjudicated. If we were to 
finally adjudicate applicant's right to change or 
to appropriate water at the time that such appli-
cation was rejected or approved, he would get 
only such rights as he could establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he could use bene-
ficially without interfering with the rights of 
others and in such hearing he would not have the 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
benefit of any opportunity to experiment and 
demonstrate what he could do. Such a system 
would cut off the possibility of establishing many 
valuable rights without a chance to demonstrate 
what could be done. 
And again on page 1138 this Court said : 
The United States answered the protests stating 
that it proposed to use only such waters as it 
could use without interfering with the rights of 
such plaintiffs and offered to modify its applica-
tion so as to protect such rights. After a hearing 
before the State Engineer, the United States 
modified its application in accordance with its 
interpretation of the evidence and such offer by 
reducing the quantity of water which it applied 
to change from 43.292 cubic feet per second ( c.f.s.) 
to 10.30 c.f.s. The engineer approved the appli-
cation subject to all rights which might be ad-
versely affected. Thus it is clear that the engi-
neer's decision did not purport to determine how 
much water the applicant could redivert and use 
from the Provo River without impairing the 
rights of others, but merely found that there was 
reason to believe that some of such waters could 
be so rediverted and used. Such approval of the 
change of place of diversion and use was expressly 
limited to such waters as could be so rediverted 
and used without impairing the rights of others. 
May we add that the actual amount of the water that 
could be so diverted and used in the present case could 
not and would not be determinable until after the plan 
of the applicant had been put into effect and the proof 
of such use submitted to the State Engineer. 
We respectfully submit that Findings of Fact Nos. 
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11 and 12 and Nos. 12 and 13, respectively, in the Court 
below and quoted in full on pages 3 and 4 of this brief 
conclusively sho·w that the applications here involved 
were properly approved by the State Engineer, and that 
this approval should have been affirmed by the Distrirt 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COUH~r RECEIVED EVIDENCE 
AND MADE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN 
EXCESS OF FrS POWER SO TO DO AND ENTERED 
JUDGl\IENT ACCORDINGLY. THAT CONCLUSION 
.NO. 4 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUl\IBERED 4 OF 
TI-IE JUDGl\1:ENT IN BOTH CASES BELOW ARE 
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE 
ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ENTER-
TAINED AND HEARD BY THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THEREFORE ARE BEYOND THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
We are concerned here with Section 73-3-14 and 
73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; Section 14 provides 
for civil actions in the district court for plenary review 
of decisions of the State Engineer. Section 15 provides 
that ''the hearing in the district court shall pr oceed as 
a trial de novo and shall be tried to the court as other 
equitable actions." The question then presents itself as 
to how far the district court may go in the introduction 
of evidence concerning the application before it. We 
should again bear in mind that the sole question for 
decision is as to whether there is probable cause to 
believe that these change applications may or may not 
be approved without impairing other rights. It is, of 
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course, impossible to demonstrate with any reasonable 
positiveness that what is proposed will have this or that 
definite effect and the importance of the words "probable 
cause'' thus becomes apparent. 
The plaintiff protestants in this case sought to and 
did introduce a very considerable amount of evidence 
dealing with fault zones, with brecciated areas, with bank 
storage, and with the raising of the water table around 
the perimeter of the reservoir. None of this evidence 
was presented in terms of second-feet or acre-feet, but 
only that there might be some loss of water by reason 
of these elements. 
Also, the record in this case is full of reference to 
"savings" and "savings applications." This is a mis-
nomer, as no savings application is involved and no ques-
tion of saving of water is involved. The United States 
sought by the change applications here to make other use 
of the water that had theretofore been consumed by 
transpiration and evaporation 011 the land inundated, 
but they did not make any savings of any water as the 
term should be properly used; and we believe that any 
reference to savings in this record should be carefully 
examined and in almost every instance the reference 
should either be to water theretofore consumed or to 
the change applications themselves. A savings applica-
tion seeks to appropriate water, not to change its place 
and nature of use. 
This Court has discussed the problem here presented 
in United States v. District Court, supra, and in the 
denial of a petition for rehearing of that same case, and 
also in Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362, in 
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Tatnner u. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, and in 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748. 
In Eardley v. Terry, supra, an applicant appealed 
to the district court from a decision of the State Engi-
neer rejecting an application to appropriate water from 
Beaver Dam \Vash. The district court reversed the State 
Engineer, ordered the application approved and then 
proceeded to adjudicate to the parties their respective 
water rights. On appeal to this Court, the action of the 
trial court in approving the application was affirmed 
but the adjudication procedure was disallowed and 
ordered deleted as "the court had no power in the cause 
to decree to the respondent (applicant) any water he may 
be able to obtain in the future by conserving and in-
creasing the flow of the stream involved.'' In discussing 
the power of the State Engineer and that of the district 
rourt on appeal, this Court said: 
''It should be remembered that the proceeding 
in the district court was by way of appeal from 
the decision of the state engineer rejecting re-
spondent's application to appropriate water. 
Under the statute, section 100-3-8, R.S. Utah 1933, 
when an application is filed, the state engineer is 
required to determine whether there is unappro-
priated water in the proposed source of supply 
and whether the water sought to be appropriated 
can be put to a beneficial use and can be diverted 
from the source of supply without doing material 
injury to the prior rights of others. While the 
statute, R.S. 1933, 100-3-7, also provides for the 
filing of protests to any application to appropriate 
water, this does not enlarge the scope of the pro-
ceedings before the state engineer beyond the 
determination of the question above stated. The 
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state engineer is required to determine whether 
the application should be rejected or approved 
by a consideration of the elements above stated. 
He does not, and has no authority in such proceed-
ing, to fix and determine the rights of the parties 
to the proceeding. He simply determines whether 
there is unappropriated water which can be bene-
ficially used without injury to or conflict with 
prior rights. If the application is approved, the 
applicant must thereafter construct his works, 
make beneficial use, and, by actual use of the 
water, fix the nature and limits of the rights 
which can be claimed and granted under the 
application. The approval or rejection of the 
application is simply a preliminary rna tter and is 
not intended to, and does not, fix the rights of the 
parties before the state engineer in such pro-
ceeding. When an appeal is taken from the deci-
sion of the state engineer in such a case, the trial 
court is required to determine the same questions 
de novo. It determines "'hether the application 
should be approved or rejected and does not fix 
the rights of the parties beyond the determination 
of that matter. The issues remain the same upon 
an appeal to this court. An that the district court 
or this court, on appeal from the district court, 
is called upon to do is to determine whether the 
application should be rejected or approved. If it 
appears that there is unappropriated water which 
the applicant seeks to appropriate and which he 
can beneficially use without injury to or conflict 
with the prior rights of others, then the applica-
tion should be approved by the court ; otherwise, 
it should be rejected. If the application is ap-
proved, then the applicant must proceed to per-
fect his appropriation as provided by law and 
make proof thereof under section 100-3-16, R.S. 
1933. Until it is so perfected, he cannot be decreed 
or giY('ll present rights as under a completed 
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appropriation. It may be that, although the ap-
plication is approved, the applicant may not be 
able to perfect his appropriation. The mere ap-
proval of the application does not assure that an 
actual appropriation of water will result. 
Were section 100-3-8, R.S. 1933, to be consid-
ered by itself, it might be thought that in deter-
mining whether an application to appropriate 
water should be approved, or rejected, the state 
engineer, and the district court upon an appeal 
from the state engineer's decision, should proceed 
to hear and dispose of the matter and impose 
upon the applicant the same burdens as if it were 
making a final disposition of. all questions grow-
ing out of the filing of the application. But section 
100-3-8, supra, does not stand alone. Sections 
100-3-16 and 100-3-17 must be considered in con-
nection therewith. By those sections it is clear 
that no final rights are acquired until the proof 
required by section 1003-16 is made and a certifi-
cate has been issued by the state engineer. Sec-
tion 100-3-16 contemplates that the works, by 
which the water applied for must be put to a bene-
ficial use before a completed appropriation giving 
rights to the use of the water can be effected. It 
is also clear that the original approval of the state 
engineer has no efficacy except that it shows that 
the applicant had the right to proceed with his 
application. Furthermore, it must be conceded 
that any adjudication involved in the approval by 
the state engineer of an application cannot be 
carried over to the proceedings on final proof as 
a binding determination of such issues raised by 
the final proof as would be said to be involved in 
approving the application.'' 
In Tanner v. Bacon, supra, the applicant again ap-
pealed from a decision of the State Engineer rejecting 
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an application. The rejection in this case was on the 
ground that approval would have been detrimental to 
the public welfare in that it would have been a serious 
obstacle to the Deer Creek project. The district court 
again reversed the State Engineer and ordered the appli-
cation approved but made that approval and the appli-
cation subject to the filings upon which the Deer Creek 
project was based. This Court affirmed and held that 
such approval on condition was proper and was not an 
enlargement of authority as the State Engineer was 
vested with the same right and power. The following 
language seems appropriate : 
"These statutes may not vest the state with the 
proprietary ownership of the water but they 
clearly do enjoin upon the state the duty to con-
trol the appropriation of the public waters in a 
manner that -..vill be for the best interests of the 
public. The precise question involved in this case 
has never been passed on by this court but similar 
questions have been before the courts of other 
states, under statutes much like ours, where it 
has been invariably held that the state may 
reject or limit applications to appropriate its un-
appropriated waters. Young & Norton v. Hinder-
linder, supra; In re Commonwealth Power Co., 
94 Neb. 613, 143 N.W. 937; Kirk v. State Board of 
Irrigation, 90 Neb. 627, 134 N.W. 167; Cooking-
ham v. Lewis, 58 Or. 484, 114 P. 88, 115 P. 342; 
In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 144 P. 505, 146 P. 
475; East Bay Utility District v. Department of 
Public Works, 1 Cal. 2d 476, 35 P. 2d 1027, 1029." 
The case of Whitmore '1'. JJ1urray City, supra, was 
an action for declaratory judgment as to priorities fol-
lowing approval by the State Engineer of an applica-
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tion filed by Murray City to change the points of diver-
sion and return of water under its power filings. This 
Court discussed the powers of the State Engineer and 
said: 
''A literal reading of the portion of the above 
section which we have italicized would lead one 
to believe that the determination of the state 
engineer, approving or denying an application for 
change of point of diversion adjudicated the rights 
of parties, since the act provides, that no such 
change shall be made 'if it impairs any vested 
right, without just compensation,' and it would 
appear that a necessary implication is that the 
state engineer must determine the existence or 
nonexistence of such vested rights before he acts, 
and that when he does act and approves an appli-
cation, that in so doing he has found that no vested 
rights are impaired. However, such a construc-
tion would fail to take cognizance of the purposes 
of our Water and Irrigation Act and the rights 
and duties of the state engineer as there set out. 
The office of state engineer was not created to 
adjudicate vested rights between parties, but to 
administer and supervise the appropriation of the 
waters of the state. In Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 
367, 77 P. 2d 362, this court considered the rights 
and duties of the state engineer in approving or 
denying an application for appropriation of water 
rights and we there held that in fulfilling his duties 
he acts in an administrative capacity only and has 
no authority to determine rights of parties. The 
same reasoning applies to the extent of the state 
engineer's authority when he determines to grant 
or deny an application for change of diversion, 
use or place. It follows that in granting Murray 
City the right to change its point of diversion and 
return,the state engineer did not adjudicate the 
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priority to the use of the water at that point of 
diversion, but merely determined that it could 
use the water at that point as long as it did not 
interfere with the prior rights of others. The 
determination of the priority of rights is a judi-
cial function and not among the powers of the 
state engineer." 
In the first United States v. District Court, supra, 
at page 1136 of the Pacific Reporter, this Court said: 
''The district court's judgment in reviewing 
the engineer's decision is limited to the issues 
determinable by the engineer and in general has 
the same effect as though it were made by him. 
The question to be determined is whether or not 
under the facts established in that court the engi-
neer's decision should be upheld or reversed 
taking into account the statutory powers of the 
engineer but the court may not determine issues 
not within the power of the engineer to determine. 
In the case of an application to appropriate or to 
change the place of diversion or use, it merely 
approves or rejects the application without deter-
mining the priorities of the parties, although 
often the facts recorded or hsown by the engi-
neer's records may be conclusive as to the priori-
ties of the rights of the parties. Usually, the 
date of the application determines its priority 
on the basis of the first in time is first in right 
but this is not always so. Plaintiff's counsel cites 
Eardley v. Terry, supra, and quotes from Whit-
more v. Murray, supra (107 Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 
750), to the effect that 'The office of state en-
gineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights 
between parties, * * *' and that 'The determina-
tion of the priority of rights is a judicial function 
and not among the powers of the state engineer.' 
He seems to conclude therefrom that the (1eci-
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sions of the engineer are administrative but 
those of the court in reviewing them somehow 
become a judicial function. The import of these 
cases are exactly opposite from that conclusion. 
Whether or not we call the engineer's decision 
administrative and the district court's decision 
judicial, no rights to the use of water accrue by 
the mere approving or rejecting of an applica-
tion, the only thing thereby determined is whether 
the applicant may proceed in accordance with the 
statute to perfect the right applied for. Riordan 
v. Westwood, Utah, 203 P. 2d 922." 
In the second United States v. District Conrt, supra, 
the defendants, although the successful parties in the 
first case, sought the rehearing,and the following langu-
age clearly delineates the claims made and the ruling 
of this court thereon : 
"Defendants further contend that some langu-
age of the opinion should be reconsidered because 
it involves questions not before the court and not 
argued. That language in substance holds that 
the judgment of the district court on an appeal 
from the State Engineer's decision only decided 
issues which the Engineer could have decided and 
such decision has no more force nor effect than 
the same decision would have had if made by the 
Engineer; that neither determines nor adjudicates 
the extent or priority of the claims of either the 
applicant or protestants, that each determine 
only whether to approve or reject the application 
based on whether or not it finds reason to believe 
that the application can be approved and the 
change to some extent effected without impairing 
the rights of others. Of course, in determining 
such question the claims of both the applicant and 
protestants must be considered but this does not 
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require that such claims must be adjudicated. 
Some of such claims may have already been adju-
dicated and in making such decision this must be 
taken into consideration; others may be somewhat 
speculative and doubtful and such claims do not 
have to be adjudicated before reaching a decision, 
for the decision is based on law and facts which 
are required to only show reason to believe, and 
not on definite findings or conclusions of fact or 
law. The Engineer is an executive officer, he is 
not required to be trained in the law nor compe-
tent to pass on or adjudicate such legal questions. 
The protestants, both in the hearing before 
the Engineer and hy their pleading in the district 
court, raise highly technical legal questions, and 
on appeal seek to adjudicate the extent of the 
right of the United States to use the water c]aimed 
by it and the priority as between it and the pro-
testants to such use. They claim that their rights 
are prior to the rights of the predecessors of the 
United States, that they consented to the use of 
such waters by such predecessors only if used 
on the lands now covered by the waters of the 
Deer Creek Reservoir where they would receive 
the benefit of the return flow and that under the 
circumstances surrounding the construction of 
the Deer Creek Reservoir the United States aban-
doned its right to the use of such waters and is 
estopped from now asserting the right to divert 
them at the new place of diversion. It is clear 
from their pleadings that the protestants now 
seek to adjudicate the rights of the United States 
to the use of these waters at the new diversion 
place, and do not concede that the decision on 
whether to grant the application should be based 
merely upon whether the court finds reason to 
believe that such change will not impair their 
rights. Of course, if they make a strong enough 
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case so that there is no reason to believe that the 
change can be made without impairing existing 
rights, it will be the duty of the court to deny 
the application, even though it does not adjudi-
cate such rights. 
Defendants correctly assert that they did not 
argue the questions discussed in the language 
objected to. But the United States, contrary to 
our decision, argued that the so called appeal to 
the district court is a new and different action 
from the one determined by the Engineer, and 
that many issues which the Engineer refused, was 
not qualified, and had no jurisdiction to determine 
will, under the pleadings in this case be adjudi-
cated in the distrirt court, and thus the United 
States will haYe been sued contrary to its sover-
eign immunity without consenting thereto. The 
defendants in their arguments did not answer 
this contention, apparently conceding that the 
issues before the district court would be greatly 
enlarged on the appeal. But we carefully con-
sidered these arguments of the United States and 
have grave doubts that if the issues may be so 
expanded on the appeal to the district court that 
such court can acquire jurisdiction to litigate 
such matters against the United States on account 
of its immunity as sovereign from being sued 
without its consent. We also recognize that this 
is not the court of last resort on that question but 
the federal courts have the final word thereon. 
We felt after studying the cases relied upon by 
the United States that it had misconstrued them 
to allow an enlargement of the issues on an 
appeal from the Engineer's decision to the court. 
We had no doubt that if the issues on such an 
appeal are limited to the issues before the State 
Engineer, then Congress has required the Recla-
mation Department to submit to such an appeal. 
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Without reaching this conclusion, there is no 
basis for our decision found in the opinion. To 
arrive at our decision, we had to rely upon the 
conclusion reached in the language objected to in 
our decision or decide other questions which we 
did not feel were necessary to decide in view of 
the conclusion reached by such language. So 
those questions were before us and necessary for 
our decision under the view we adopted. A modi-
fication of the language complained of in accord-
ance with defendants' petition would require us 
to determine the question of whether the United 
States is immune from a suit to determine its 
right to the use of this water which we were not 
required to determine under the view we took. 
The reasons supporting the conclusions ob-
jected to are sound. The term" appeal" indicates 
a re-examination by a higher tribunal of issues 
determined in the original trial, or at least issues 
which could have been so determined. It is a mis-
nomer to call it an appeal where the appellate 
tribunal may hear and determine issues which the 
original could not have determined and where 
such determination has the effect of adjudicating 
such issues which could not be adjudicated by the 
decision of the original officer or tribunal. We 
know of no case of an appeal from the decision 
of an executive board or officer where the appel-
late tribunal adjudicates new issues not within 
the jurisdiction of the original tribunal to de-
termine. 
If we are correct in our conclusion that the 
district court on an appeal from the Engineer's 
decision only decides issues which the Engineer 
could have decided and that it does not adjudicate 
any rights except those on which the Engineer's 
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decision is final unless it is set aside, then the 
district court on this appeal cannot adjudicate 
the extent or priority of the right of the United 
States to the use of this water. The statute makes 
no provision for the determination of the priori-
ties of the applicant and the protestants or the 
extent of their rights. It merely requires an 
approval or rejection of the application and, if 
approved, authorizes the applicant to proceed 
with his proposed work and forbids him to pro-
ceed if rejected. See Sec. 100-3-10, U.C.A. 1943. 
It leaves the adjudication of the rights which the 
applicant may have or may acquire under the 
application, and the rights of the protestants, to 
the courts in another kind of a proceeding and 
not to the Engineer who is merely an executive 
officer. Neither the decision of the Engineer nor 
of the court on an appeal therefrom are based 
on a determination of the facts or the law applic-
able thereto but the application must be approved 
in both cases if the tribunal concludes that there 
is reason to believe that no existing right will 
thereby be impaired. * * •" 
We respectfully submit that the evidence presented 
was improper, that it sought a balancing of accounts as 
between the parties prematurely and that it involved 
matters of law with respect to the rights of the parties. 
The State Engineer could not and did not rule upon 
these matters and it was not proper for the trial court 
to have passed upon them. 
CONCLUSION 
It is our contention that there was only one issue 
presented to the district court namely, could the appli-
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cant, the United States, change the point of diversion, 
place and nature of use of the water here involved with-
out impairment of the rights of lower users. The trial 
court found that this amount of water under prereservoir 
conditions was consumed and was lost to the river and 
to the lower users and it is not possible to conceive of a 
situation wherein these lower users could be hurt by a 
change of this water. And it is our further contention 
that the conclusion as to the loss of water through leak-
age, seepage, evaporation and transpiration was not a 
proper consideration for the trial court, that it broadened 
the issues beyond the scope of the State Engineer and 
attempts to adjudicate the rights of the parties prema-
turely. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed and that the applications 
should be approved but limited specifically to the amount 
of water actually found by the trial court to have been 
consumed and lost to the river under the conditions that 
existed before construction of Deer Creek Reservoir. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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